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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

A New Legal Regime for Bilateral
Assistance Programs: International
Agreements Governing the
"Nunn-Lugar" Demilitarization
Program in the Former Soviet Union
JACK

M.

BEARD*

On December 12, 1991, President George Bush signed into law
an unprecedented piece of legislation popularly referred to as the
"Nunn-Lugar Act" in honor of the Act's principal sponsors, Sena-

tors Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.' The Act, which Congress has
enlarged with subsequent legislation2 and funded with authoriza-

tion and appropriations acts providing up to $1.6 billion over the
course of four years, 3 created a complicated legal and fiscal frame-

* Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs & Intelligence), U.S.
Department of Defense. Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.
1. The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note (1994).
2. See The Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5931
(1994); The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993,22 U.S.C. 33 5951-5958 (1994); The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, §§ 12011209, 108 Stat. 2663, 2882-88 (1994).
3. All funding for the Nunn-Lugar program is provided exclusively from Department of
Defense appropriations or Department of Defense accounts pursuant to the following
appropriations acts: the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
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work to use United States Department of Defense resources to
provide assistance to states of the former Soviet Union in order to

facilitate the demilitarization of the former Soviet Union's military
facilities, technologies and capabilities and to help prevent the
proliferation of weapons, weapons technology and weapons expertise from the former Soviet Union. 4 In order for the U.S. Depart-

ment of Defense to provide the assistance envisioned by the NunnLugar legislation, a number of complex bilateral agreements have
been negotiated and concluded with the states of the former Soviet

Union. These "Nunn-Lugar" or "Cooperative Threat Reduction" 5
(CTR) agreements have established a unique legal regime for

delivering, using and auditing this assistance. 6 Unlike other inter-

national agreements under which the United States may simply
provide cash, loans or some other form of aid to a foreign country,
these CTR agreements are designed and required to directly sup335, Title II, 108 Stat. 2599, 2606 (1994); the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, Title II, 107 Stat. 1418, 1426 (1993); the Defense Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-396, § 9110, 106 Stat. 1876, 1928 (1992); and, the
Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers for Relief from the Effects of
Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Cost of "Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm" Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-229, § 108, 105 Stat. 1701, 1708
(1991). Each of these four appropriations acts made up to $400 million in appropriations
or transfer authority available to fund the Nunn-Lugar Program, albeit with numerous
restrictions.
4. The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 212, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note,
authorized the establishment of programs to: "(1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical
weapons, and other weapons, (2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in
connection with their destruction, and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the
proliferation of such weapons." The Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992
§ 1412(b), 22 U.S.C. § 5902(b), authorized additional areas of cooperation, including:
preventing the diversion of the former Soviet Union's weapons-related scientific expertise
to terrorist groups or third countries; facilitating the demilitarization of defense industries
of the former Soviet Union and the conversion of military technologies and capabilities
into civilian activities; establishing science and technology centers in the independent states
of the former Soviet Union to engage weapons scientists, engineers and other experts
previously involved with nuclear, chemical and other weapons in productive, non-military
undertakings; and, expanding military-to-military contacts between the United States and
the independent states of the former Soviet Union.
5. Since Congress enacted the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 5951-5958, the U.S. Department of Defense has frequently referred to this program as
the "Cooperative Threat Reduction" program, rather than the "Nunn-Lugar" program,
although the terms are often used interchangeably. See Letter from William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense, to Thomas J. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives 1 (Feb.
16, 1994)(on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law); Letter from William J.
Perry, Secretary of Defense, to Newton Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives
1 (June 24, 1995)(on file with the Virginia Journalof InternationalLaw).
6. A list of these agreements appears in the Appendix to this Article.
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port specific U.S. national security objectives while complying7 with
a complicated set of statutory restrictions and requirements.

Although each of the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union could ultimately become eligible to receive CTR

assistance, 8 the Department of Defense has only provided such
assistance to those countries where the former Soviet Union had
based its nuclear weapons: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Fed-

eration and Ukraine. This allocation of assistance is based on the
statutory requirement that the President certify that each recipient

state is committed to six specific courses of action before it is actually eligible to receive CTR assistance. 9 To date, the United States

government has chosen to certify only the four republics on whose
territory nuclear weapons were located. 10 These certification

7. Section 1203 of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 provides that CTR
programs may be carried out "only to the extent that the President [as delegated to the
Secretary of Defense] determines that the program will directly contribute to the national
security interests of the United States." Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 § 1203,
22 U.S.C. § 5952.
8.The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 212(b). 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note.
authorized "cooperation among the United States, the Soviet Union. its republics, and any
successor entities." The Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 § 1412(b), 22
U.S.C. § 5902(b), and The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 § 1203(b). 22 U.S.C.
§ 5952(b), authorized demilitarization programs with "the independent states of the former
Soviet Union."
9. To be eligible to receive CTR assistance, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act
requires certification that each proposed recipient country is committed to the following
six courses of action: (1) Making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling
or destroying weapons of mass destruction, if such recipient has an obligation under a
treaty or other agreement to destroy or dismantle any such weapons; (2) Foregoing any
military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and
foregoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; (3) Foregoing any
use in new nuclear weapons of fissionable or other components of destroyed nuclear
weapons; (4) Facilitating U.S. verification of any weapons destruction carried out under the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (Title XII of Pub. L 103-160), the Former
Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (Title XIV of Pub. L 102-484), and the Soviet
Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (Title II of Pub. L 102-228); (5) Complying with all
relevant arms control agreements; and (6) Observing internationally recognized human
rights, including protection of minorities. Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993
§ 1203(d), 22 U.S.C. § 5952(d).
Similar certification requirements appear in the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of
1991 § 211(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note, and the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of
1992 § 1412(d), 22 U.S.C. § 5902(d).
10. The Secretary of State transmitted the most recent certification of these four
republics to Congress on January 12, 1995. Certification Pursuant to the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (Jan. 12, 1995) (on file with the Virginia Journal of
International Law). Although to date the United States government has provided
assistance under the Nunn-Lugar legislation primarily to address nuclear weapons
concerns, such assistance is not limited to nuclear weapons and is available for destruction
programs involving conventional, chemical and biological weapons as well. Soviet Nuclear
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requirements were the subject of intense debate in connection with

the passage of the original 1991 Nunn-Lugar legislation, and the
U.S. Congress recently approved additional requirements. 1

I.

THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT

Arguing in support of the original 1991 Nunn-Lugar legislation,
Senator Nunn used a pragmatic analogy to describe the choices
facing the Senate: "As the auto mechanic on television used to tell
us, holding a new oil filter in one hand and a huge bill for engine

overhaul in the other, we can pay now for modest preventative
measures, or we can pay later for major, expensive defense and

deterrence programs. '"12 Emphasizing that the aim of the proposed

demilitarization program was to achieve specific national security

objectives and not merely to provide assistance to the former
Soviet Union, Senator Nunn stated that "[i]t is far from a blank
check. To me it is not foreign aid, it is self-defense.' 1 3 In a speech
to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary of Defense
William Perry echoed these remarks, stressing that "Nunn-Lugar is
reducing the nuclear threat missile by missile, factory by factory,
and person by person.... This was what we call 'defense by other

means.'

"14

Threat Reduction Act § 212(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note; Former Soviet Union
Demilitarization Act of 1992 § 1412(b), 22 U.S.C. § 5902(b); Cooperative Threat
Reduction Act of 1993 § 1203(b), 22 U.S.C. § 5952(b).
11. See, e.g., H.R. 1530, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1208(a) (1995) (providing that of the
funds appropriated pursuant to applicable authorizations for the CTR program, $60
million may not be obligated or expended until the President submits to Congress a
certification that Russia is, among other things, in compliance with its obligations under
the biological weapons convention).
12. 137 Cong. Rec. S18,005 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
13. Id. Senator Lugar expressed similar sentiments, arguing that the proposed
legislation was "narrow in focus. It contains appropriate conditions that must be met ....
"
137 Cong. Rec. S18,006 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Lugar). He further
stated that 'it]his is not foreign aid; our amendment is part of a national security package."
Id. Many of the senators and congressmen supporting the original 1991 Nunn-Lugar
legislation were emphatic on this point, stressing the limited and specific national security
objectives to be achieved: "Our people understand; they know this is not a foreign aid
package. This is an American security package targeted toward the security of our own
people." 137 Cong. Rec. S18,006 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Levin).
14. Secretary of Defense William Perry, Address at the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations (Mar. 8, 1995) (transcript on file with the Virginia Journalof InternationalLaw),
Similarly, in focusing on the non-proliferation aspects of the program, National Security
Advisor Anthony Lake has remarked that "[w]e have, through Nunn-Lugar funds, helped
to increase the security of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union." National Security
Advisor Anthony Lake, White House Briefing (Mar. 1, 1995) (transcript on file with the
Virginia Journalof InternationalLaw).
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In addition to specific dismantlement and demilitarization objectives, supporters of the original legislation stressed several specific
nonproliferation objectives, particularly those related to preventing
the proliferation of weapons expertise. Senator Nunn said that the
program this proposal contemplated "can also, most importantly,
engage Soviet weapons experts and underscore the importance of
preventing the export of weapons and weapons expertise to the
Saddam Husseins and the Mu'ammar Gadhafis of the Third
World."' 15 Accordingly, in describing the Nunn-Lugar legislation's
implementation, Defense Secretary Perry has emphasized these
objectives and noted that "by helping to ensure the safe dismantlement of the old Soviet arsenal, and the conversion of nuclear weapons industries to peaceful enterprises, [CTR assistance] helps
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technical1 6expertise to
states eager to advance their own nuclear weapons.1
Due to its unique purposes and specific restrictions, the CTR
program has been described in hearings before the U.S. Congress
as a wise investment for the United States: "Dollar for dollar, there
is no better way to spend national security resources than to help
eliminate a former enemy's nuclear weapons and convert its industry to peaceful enterprises."'1 7 In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
described the CTR program as
one of the most prudent and wise programs that I think
the Congress has ever enacted. It has done a great deal to
lift the nuclear threat from the United States and the
world. To just speak in broad terms, the Nunn-Lugar
funds were essential to persuading Kazakhstan to give up
its Nuclear Program and to agree to commit to the NonProliferation Treaty. Nunn-Lugar funds were essential to
15. 137 Cong. Rec. S18,004 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
16. Consideration of Ratification of the Treaty Between the U.S. and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms (The
START Treaty) Treaty Doc. 103-1: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 73, 77 (1995) (statement of William J. Perry, Secretary of
Defense).

17. Id. Arguments by supporters in Congress on the "bargain" the Nunn-Lugar
legislation would achieve usually focused on the distinction between the program's specific

national security objectives and foreign aid programs: "Mr. President, this amendment is
not one which ignores our domestic needs. It is not foreign aid. It is a true grand bargain

and is perhaps as effective a way to spend a share of our budget for national defense as any
which could possibly be adopted." 137 Cong. Rec. S18,007 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Gorton).
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persuade Ukraine to give up its nuclear program and
commit to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Both of those countries were able to ratify the START I
treaty, because they were prepared to give up their
Nuclear Program. The Nunn-Lugar funds have been
absolutely essential in enabling the Russians to dismantle
nuclear missiles ....
[A]s I say, it is one of the most prudent, wise,
far
18
sighted programs that I think has been enacted.

Summarizing the prevailing theme associated with the NunnLugar legislation and emphasizing the unique role and purpose of
CTR funds, one senator reminded Secretary Christopher that

"[w]hat Nunn-Lugar funds are all about is not to give away money
needlessly to Russia, but to give money to projects that enhance

the national security interests of the United States directly by
reducing the threat in that area."' 19 It is this often cited imperative

of "not giving money away," the adamant statements of the sponsors of the Nunn-Lugar legislation that it was not intended to be
"foreign aid" and the program's clear and essential connection to

specific national security objectives and specific demilitarization
goals that have required the negotiation of the unique bilateral

assistance regime which now governs CTR assistance activities.
II.

THE "UMBRELLA" AGREEMENT FRAMEWORK

The Department of Defense provides CTR assistance to each of
the four eligible republics of the former Soviet Union pursuant to
"umbrella" agreements that establish an overall legal framework
for CTR assistance activities.2" Each of these four umbrella agree18. Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings Before the
Senate Budget Committee, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 433-34 (1995) (statement of Warren
Christopher, Secretary of State).
19. Id. at 433 (statement of Sen. Exon).
20. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan
Concerning the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles,
Emergency Response, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Dec. 13,
1993, U.S.-Kazakhstan, Hein's No. KAV 3751, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-32 [hereinafter
the U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement]; Agreement Between Ukraine and the
United States of America Concerning Assistance to Ukraine in the Elimination of
Strategic Nuclear Arms, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Oct. 25, 1993, U.S.-Ukraine, Hein's No. KAV 3765, Temp. State Dep't No. 9446 [hereinafter the U.S.-Ukraine CTR Umbrella Agreement]; Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Republic of Belarus Concerning Emergency Response
and the Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Oct. 22, 1992,
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ments provides a system of rights, exemptions and protections for
U.S. assistance personnel and CTR activities and designates "Executive Agents" to implement CTR assistance programs for each

government. For the United States, the designated executive agent
is the Department of Defense.2 ' This designation corresponds with

the Defense Department's responsibilities for the appropriations
involved and with the intent of the original Nunn-Lugar legislation,
which provided that the Department of Defense was to serve as the
executive agent for any programs established under the Act. 2
Consistent with the Defense Department's accountability for the

funds and objectives involved, the President has delegated his statutory responsibilities and duties for the conduct of the CTR pro-

gram to the Secretary of Defense.23 These responsibilities include
complying with specific requirements related to the conduct of the
program, notifying Congress of proposed obligations and providing

various reports on the status of the CTR program. The President

U.S.-Belarus, Hein's No. KAV 3416, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-252 [hereinafter the U.S.Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement]; Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and
Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, June 17, 1992, U.S.Russia, Hein's No. KAV 3349, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-171 [hereinafter the U.S.-Russia
CIR Umbrella Agreement].
21. U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. II; US.-Ukraine
CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. I1;U.S.-Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement,
supra note 20, art II; U.S.-Russia CTR Umbrella Agreement. supra note 20, art. III.
The Executive Agent for the Russian Federation is the Ministry of the Russian
Federation for Atomic Energy, for agreements involving activities other than those directly
related to nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation has designated other entities as the
Executive Agent, such as a special state committee for an implementing agreement
addressing chemical weapons destruction. See Agreement Between the Department of
Defense of the United States of America and the President's Committee on Conventional
Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons of the Russian Federation Concerning the
Safe, Secure and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons, July 30, 1992, art.
2 (on file with the Virginia Journal of International L w). The Executive Agents for
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are each country's respective ministry of defense, unless
otherwise officially designated for a particular implementing agreement.
22. The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 221(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2251 note.
23. Memorandum of the President of Jan. 29, 1994, para. 2, 59 Fed. Reg. 5929 (1994)
(delegating responsibilities under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, 22
U.S.C. §§ 5951-5958); Memorandum of the President of Dec. 30, 1992, para. 2,58 Fed. Reg.
3193 (1993) (delegating responsibilities under the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization
Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5931 and related legislation); Memorandum of the
President of Mar. 20, 1992, para. 2, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,554 (1992) (delegating responsibilities
under the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,22 U.S.C. § 2551 note, and related
legislation).

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 35:895

has delegated the task of certifying each state's eligibility to receive
the assistance to the Secretary of State.24

Each of the four umbrella agreements authorizes the executive
agent to conclude "implementing agreements," which are subject
to and governed by the terms of the umbrella agreement and which

provide more detailed terms for specific assistance projects. By
October 1995, the Defense Department had concluded thirty-four

such implementing agreements: twelve with ministries of the Russian Federation; eight with ministries of the Republic of Belarus;

seven with ministries of the Republic of Kazakhstan; and seven
with ministries of Ukraine. These project-specific implementing
agreements address a wide variety of cooperative demilitarization
activities, including agreements on eliminating of strategic offen26
sive arms, 25 controlling and accounting for nuclear materials,
defense conversion,27 export control,28 emergency assistance
24. Memorandum of the President of Jan. 29, 1994, para. 1, 59 Fed. Reg. 5929 (1994);
Memorandum of the President of Dec. 30, 1992, para. 1, 58 Fed. Reg. 3193 (1993);
Memorandum of the President of Mar. 20, 1992, para. 1, 57 Fed Reg. 11,554 (1992).
25. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Committee for Defense Industry of the Russian Federation Concerning
Cooperation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms, Aug. 26, 1993, Hein's No.
KAV 3663, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-173.
26. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety Concerning
Development of State Systems of Control, Accounting, and Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material to Promote the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation from Ukraine, Dec.
18, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3763, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-44 (entered into force Dec. 31,
1993).
27. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the
Conversion of Military Technologies and Capabilities into Civilian Activities, Mar. 19,
1994, Hein's No. KAV 3823, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-109; Protocol Between the
Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministries of Defense and
Economics of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Implementation of Certain
Defense Conversion Projects, Dec. 16, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3742, Temp. State Dep't No.
94-24; Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus Concerning the Conversion of
Military Technologies and Capabilities into Civilian Activities, July 22, 1993, Hein's No.
KAV 3637, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-152.
28. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Expert and Technical Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
Concerning the Provision of Assistance to Ukraine Related to the Establishment of an
Export Control System to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction from
Ukraine, Dec. 5, 1993 as amended on Mar. 21, 1994, Hein's No. KAV 3831, Temp. State
Dep't No. 94-117; Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the
Provision of Assistance to the Republic of Kazakhstan Related to the Establishment of
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related to removing nuclear weapons, 29 establishing special com-

munications systems for disarmament activities, 30 nuclear weapons
transportation security 31 and constructing a facility for storing fissile materials derived from the destruction of nuclear weapons.'

Although these implementing agreements address a number of different subjects, they contain certain common safeguards, rights and

restrictions which, together with provisions in the umbrella agreements, constitute a unique legal regime for the delivery, use and

accounting of bilateral assistance. This Article examines the essential provisions that make up this legal regime in the following general categories: fiscal provisions; performance

and auditing

provisions; status of personnel/activities provisions; and liability
provisions.
A. Fiscal Provisions and Relations with the U.S. Congress
Few U.S. government-sponsored international assistance pro-

grams have involved as many complex statutory and fiscal restricExport Control Systems to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Dec. 13, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3752, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-33.
29. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the Provision to Ukraine of
Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training in Connection with the Removal of
Nuclear Warheads from Ukraine for Destruction in the Course of Elimination of Strategic
Nuclear Arms, Dec. 18, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3759. Temp. State Dep't No. 94-40.
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus Concerning the Provision of Emergency
Response Equipment and Related Training in Connection with the Removal of Nuclear
Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems from the Republic of Belarus for
Destruction, Oct. 22, 1992, Hein's No. KAV 3416, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-252.
30. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the
Provision to the Republic of Kazakhstan of Material and Services for the Establishment of
a Government-to-Government Communications Link, Dec. 13, 1993, Hein's No. KAV
3752, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-33; Agreement Between the Department of Defense of
the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus
Concerning the Provision of Material and Services for the Establishment of a Continuous
Communication Link, Jan. 15, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3481, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-37.
31. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation
in Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Through Provision of Material, Services, and
Related Training, Apr. 3, 1995 (on file with the VirginiaJoutrnalof InternationalLaw).
32. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning the
Provision of Material, Services, and Training Relating to the Construction of a Safe,
Secure, and Ecologically Sound Storage Facility for Fissile Material Derived from the
Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, Sept. 2, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3667, Temp. State Dep't
No. 93-178.
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tions as those which apply to CTR assistance under the Nunn-

Lugar legislation. In the program's first two years, Congress did
not actually appropriate any new funds to the Department of

Defense for CTR assistance, choosing instead to authorize a trans33
fer of up to $400 million annually from existing Defense accounts,
subject to case-by-case determinations by the Office of Management and Budget. 34 Congress made these transfers and appropria-

tions subject to numerous spending ceilings and floors, 35 and
required the Defense Department to notify Congress fifteen days
prior to the transfer or obligation of such funds. 36 Funds transferred to Defense accounts for CTR activities also became subject
to the same restrictions that apply to other Defense appropriations

in those accounts, including time limits on the availability of those
funds.

These numerous restrictions have made it important for the
Department of Defense to notify Congress of any proposed agreements that would commit CTR funds and have given rise to

unique fiscal provisions in CTR implementing agreements.37 As
the Department of Defense cannot transfer or obligate funds in

excess of specific amounts notified to Congress, each CTR imple33. Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 221(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note;
Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 § 1421(a), 22 U.S.C. § 5911. For
example, a notification to Congress regarding proposed CrR activities in the Republic of
Belarus identified funds for Navy Research, Test & Evaluation for the rident II
submarine and satellite laser communications, as well as funds for Air Force procurement
of the advanced cruise missiles, as the source of funding for Belarus programs. See Letter
from Alice C. Maroni, Principal Deputy Comptroller, U.S. Dep't of Defense to Albert
Gore, Jr., President of the Senate (July, 6, 1993) (on file with the Virginia Journal of
InternationalLaw).
34. Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 221(e), 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note.
35. The Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 5911(a); The
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, 22 U.S.C. § 5954(a); Defense Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-335, Title II, 108 Stat. 2599,2606 (1994); Defense
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, Title II, 107 Stat. 1418, 1426
(1993); Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-396, § 9110(b),
106 Stat. 1876, 1928 (1992). The requirement in § 9110(b) of the Defense Appropriation
Act for Fiscal Year 1993 that of fiscal year 1993 funds appropriated for C'rR activities, "not
less than $10,000,000 shall be available only for the study, assessment, and identification of
nuclear waste disposal by the former Soviet Union in the Arctic region... [and] not more
than $40,000,000 may be made available for demilitarization of defense industries"
provides an example. Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102396, § 9110(b), 106 Stat. 1876, 1928 (1992).
36. Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 231, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note; Former
Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 § 1431(a), 22 U.S.C. § 5921(a); Cooperative
Threat Reduction Act of 1993 § 1206(a), 22 U.S.C. § 5955(a).
37. By October 1995, the Department of Defense had submitted 29 such notifications to
Congress.
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menting agreement contains a provision limiting the amount of

monetary assistance to the amount previously notified to Congress
for each project. A typical CTR implementing agreement thus

provides: "The total cost to [the] Department of Defense of the
United States of America for all assistance provided to Ukraine

pursuant to this Agreement and all associated expenses, including
costs relating to the transportation of material and personnel to
and from Ukraine shall not exceed 40 million U.S. dollars."38

This unusual monetary limitation provision in CTR agreements
has led to the establishment of a unique system of project-by-pro-

ject organization, ensuring that each CTR implementing agreement has a specific sum of money available for related
expenditures. This approach has also given rise to a process in
which progress by recipient governments in the implementation of
CTR agreements may be accompanied by amendments which

incrementally increase the funds available to fulfill each agree-

ment's original or expanded objectives. 39 The Defense Depart-

ment notifies proposed obligations of funds to support these
amendments to Congress in accordance with the Nunn-Lugar legislation. These proposals usually involve amendments to CTR
implementing agreements that increase the ceiling on the amount
of funds that the Department of Defense may expend on the agree-

ment in question. By October 1995, the Defense Department had40
concluded twenty-three such amendments for increased funding.

Amendments which expand the scope of the agreement or the
38. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Machine Building, Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion of
Ukraine Concerning the Conversion of Enterprises of the Military-Industrial Complex.
Mar. 21, 1994, art. III, Hein's No. KAV 3829, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-115 (emphasis
added).
39. A provision authorizing the Department of Defense to spend up to SI million on
export control activities in Belarus, for example, was amended by substituting the phrase
"2.26 million U.S. dollars." Amendment to the Agreement Between the Department of
Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Belarus Concerning the Provision of Assistance Related to the Establishment of Export
Control Systems to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction from the
Republic of Belarus, July 22, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3638, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-153.
A similar amendment increased the ceiling for expenditures on chemical weapons
destruction activities from $25 million to $55 million. Amendment to the Agreement
Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the President's
Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological weapons of the Russian
Federation Concerning the Safe, Secure and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical
Weapons, Mar. 18, 1994, Hein's No. KAV 3821, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-107.
40. The list of agreements that appears in the Appendix to this Article includes the
amendments to CIR implementing agreements.
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types of assistance to be provided may also accompany a recipient
government's progress.4

One important element in each CTR implementing agreement is
the discretionary nature of the Defense Department obligation
involved. Although the recipient governments are not required to
reimburse or pay for any CTR assistance received, 42 the Department of Defense is usually under no legal obligation to actually

provide any specific amount of assistance. This discretionary element is expressed throughout CTR implementing agreements in
terms of the types of assistance the Department of Defense may,

rather than shall, provide, usually in terms of monetary limits that
the Department of Defense shall not exceed. For example, the

operative section of one CTR implementing agreement addressing
export control assistance provides: "The Department of Defense of

the United States of America and its designated agents may, at
their discretion and based on their assessment of the requirements,

provide assistance to the Iinistry of Defense of the Republic of
Belarus in any or all of the following areas .... "143
This discretionary element supplements an article in each CTR
umbrella agreement which provides that "[t]he activities of the
United States of America under this Agreement are subject to
[the] availability of appropriated funds."" Such provisions have
already proven to be wise additions to the legal regime governing
CTR assistance in light of the multi-year nature of CTR agree41. By October 1995, three such amendments expanding the scope or type of assistance
had been concluded. See, e.g., Amendment to the Agreement Between the Ministry of the
Russian Federation for Atomic Energy and the Department of Defense of the United
States of America Concerning the Provision of Material, Services, and Training Relating to
the Construction of a Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Storage Facility for Fissile
Material Derived from the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, June 20, 1995 (on file with the
VirginiaJournal of InternationalLaw).
42. Although the original Nunn-Lugar legislation envisioned that the President would
condition CTR assistance on reimbursement or repayment by recipient governments, the
President has never imposed such a condition in any CrR implementing agreement.
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 222, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note.
43. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus Concerning the Provision of
Assistance Related to the Establishment of Export Control Systems to Prevent the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction from the Republic of Belarus, Oct. 22, 1992,
art. V, para. 2 (on file with the Virginia Journalof International Law).
44. U.S.-Russia CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VIII; see also U.S.Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. X (similar provision); U.S.Ukraine CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XII (same); U.S.-Belarus CTR
Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VIII (same). These provisions are common to
many agreements to which the United States is a party.
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ments and the actions taken by the U.S. Congress in 1993 and 1994,

which effectively terminated the availability of nearly $330 million

in CTR funds for certain ongoing CTR projects. 45 Although this

resulted in the delay or temporary suspension of some assistance
activities, ultimately the Defense Department avoided lengthy dis-

cussions with recipient governments over these "de-funded agreements" by re-notifying Congress of its intention to fund these
earlier agreements out of new fiscal year 1994 and 1995 appropriations.46 In light of this tumultuous history and the increasingly

arduous journey that appropriations for any foreign operations
face in the U.S. Congress, the unique fiscal provisions in CTR
agreements appear to correspond appropriately to fiscal (and Congressional) realities. 47 It is also clear that what the U.S. Congress
45. Congress chose not to extend the fiscal year 1992 Nunn-Lugar transfer authority
beyond 1993, resulting in a loss of $212 million required for outstanding international
commitments which were to be funded by these fiscal year 1992 funds. In addition, the
following year Congress did not extend the availability of some fiscal year 1993 CTR funds
beyond fiscal year 1993, by making their extension subject to an appropriations act that
required a "reprogramming action." The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993. 22
U.S.C. § 5954(c); Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L No. 103-139.
Title II, 107 Stat. 1418, 1426 (1993).
In the course of these subsequent reprogramming actions. Congress did not authorize
the extension of fiscal year 1993 CrR funds or make them available beyond fiscal year
1993 for certain multi-year, ongoing CTR projects which were originally notified to be
funded out of fiscal year 1993 funds, such as those funds designated for defense conversion
activities in the Russian Federation.
46. This reprogramming action in the summer of 1994 directly affected several ongoing
CTR programs, forcing the Department of Defense to suspend temporarily some activities
under existing agreements, pending further Congressional action. Particularly difficult in
this regard was the conflict between Congressional appropriation and authorization
committees, reflecting in some instances different priorities for the CTR program. This
problem was most apparent with respect to defense conversion and housing initiatives.
When the Department of Defense proposed to use fiscal year 1995 funds to pay for
previously planned defense conversion activities, the Chairman of the National Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations wrote a letter to the Secretary
of Defense reminding him that "[li]ast summer, the Department proposed to use its
reprogramming authority to fund over $300 million of CTR programs. While the
Committee approved the great majority of this proposal, it specifically disapproved all
defense conversion and housing projects." Letter from C.W. Bill Young, Representative,
U.S. Congress, to William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense (Feb. 21, 1995) (on file with the
Virginia Journal of International Law). The House Appropriations National Security
Subcommittee ultimately recommended that the entire $80 million in fiscal year 1995 funds
that the Department of Defense had requested for defense conversion and housing be
rescinded, and on February 10, 1995 the Full Committee on Appropriations endorsed this
recision. Congress ultimately cut funding from the Nunn-Lugar program by rescinding $20
million from fiscal year 1995 appropriations. Fiscal Year 1995 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Public Law 104-6, Title II, ch. II,109 Stat. 73 (1995).
47. In July 1995, Congress again sought to reduce expenditures on the Nunn-Lugar
Program and impose additional restrictions on program activities for fiscal year 1996. In
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finds unpopular when addressing funding for foreign operations
generally, it finds even more unpopular for funding proposed

assistance for states of the former Soviet Union.48

B.

Performance and Auditing Provisions

CTR agreements employ a number of different mechanisms to
ensure that the recipients of the Defense Department's assistance
use it in a way that promotes the national security interests of the

United States by performing specific demilitarization objectives.
First, CTR implementing agreements generally authorize only the
provision of materials, goods and services, as opposed to grants of
cash or financial assistance.4 9 As the Secretary of Defense stated in
a recent report to Congress on auditing of CTR assistance: "DoD,
addition to rejecting the President's fiscal year 1996 budget request of $371 million and
approving only $200 million for the program, the Committee on National Security of the
House of Representatives recommended "denial of funds for the construction of a fissile
material storage facility in Russia; denial of authorization for Demilitarization Enterprise
Fund activities; and a reduction of $4 million for other program support activities." H.R.
Rep. No. 131, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1995). The construction of this fissile material
storage facility is already the subject of an existing international agreement. See
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the
Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning the Provision of
Material, Services, and Training Relating to the Construction of a Safe, Secure, and
Ecologically Sound Storage Facility for Fissile Material Derived from the Destruction of
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 32. The Committee also specifically denied a $104 million
request for construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia which is
closely related to activities under another existing agreement. See Agreement Between
the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the President's
Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons of the Russian
Federation Concerning the Safe, Secure and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical
Weapons, supra note 21.
48. Many in Congress opposed even the limited humanitarian assistance package for the
former Soviet Union that accompanied the original 1991 Nunn-Lugar legislation,
prompting one congressional supporter to recall the following conversation with a
volunteer worker in Pennsylvania: "'Ozzie. what do you think of the idea of giving the
Russians new humanitarian aid?' He said, 'I neve[r] saw any skinny Russians on
television.'" 137 Cong. Rec. H1,470 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Murtha).
49. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the
Provision of Material, Services and Related Training to the Republic of Kazakhstan in
Connection with the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
and Associated Equipment and Components, Dec. 13, 1993, art. 1, para. 1, Hein's No.
KAV 3750, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-31 (providing that assistance shall be provided "in
the form of material, services, and related training pursuant to the terms of this
Agreement."). Similarly, the U.S.-Ukraine Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. I,
provides that CTR assistance shall be provided through implementing agreements
"through the provision of technical assistance, material, services, and training."
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as a matter of policy, [generally] does not directly provide any
financial assistance to the recipient states. This policy forecloses
the most likely path of diversion-misuse of funds. ' 50 This policy
is also consistent with the purpose of the original 1991 Nunn-Lugar
legislation, which proponents argued would benefit U.S. businesses
and be implemented through U.S. personnel, not through cash
grants to the former Soviet Union. As Congressman Aspin noted,
"[w]e are not going to hand over dollars here. There is no handing
over of cash. That is money down a rat hole .... We cannot funnel
economic aid into that country'51without losing a lot of it, and that is
not what we are doing here.
Second, the Department of Defense provides all such assistance
subject to the explicit condition that the recipient state use it exclusively for specific CTR implementing agreement demilitarization
objectives. For example, a CTR implementing agreement concerning elimination of strategic offensive arms provides that: "The
Committee for Defense Industry of the Russian Federation shall
use all material, services, and training provided pursuant to this
Agreement exclusively for the purpose of facilitating the expeditious elimination of ICBMs, ICBM silo launchers, SLBMs, SLBM
launchers, and heavy bombers."52
Third, in addition to general or overall conditions, various CTR
implementing agreements require the recipient to meet a series of
steps or incremental objectives before additional assistance is provided. For example, the CTR implementing agreement governing
assistance for the construction of a facility for storing fissile materials derived from the destruction of nuclear weapons in Russia, conditions additional levels of assistance and the delivery of certain
types of equipment on the Ministry of the Russian Federation for
Atomic Energy providing required design data to the Department
of Defense, written notification of site selection, written confirmation that all necessary permits and approvals have been obtained
and the beginning of site preparation as defined in the agreement,
50. Letter from William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, to Newton Gingrich, Speaker of
the House of Representatives 2 (May 31, 1995) (on file with the Vrginia Journal of

InternationalLaw) (transmitting the Report to Congress on Accounting for United States
Assistance Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, made pursuant to the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L No. 103-337, § 1203).
51. 137 Cong. Rec. H11,473 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Aspin).
52. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Committee for Defense Industry of the Russian Federation Concerning

Cooperation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms. supra note 25. art. I. para. 2.
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to include site clearing, site excavation and construction of access

53
roads and staging areas.

Fourth, equipment the Department of Defense provides under
the CTR Program is subject to a series of special protections and
performance-related restrictions. Many CTR implementing agreements include annexes that detail agreed descriptions of the particular types of equipment which Defense Department experts have

concluded are required for specific dismantlement or demilitariza-

tion projects.54 To better ensure that the recipient government

uses the equipment properly and effectively, CTR agreements also
establish various procedures governing the delivery of the equipment, requirements that the recipient government take responsibil-

ity for the equipment immediately upon its arrival at the place of
delivery, training requirements and the establishment of related
technical specifications by the Department of Defense. 55

Fifth, CTR assistance is also subject to retransfer restrictions
similar to those applicable to various types of U.S. military assistance and often appear in other agreements to which the United
States is a party.56 Thus, each CTR umbrella agreement contains a
provision such as the following:
Unless the written consent of the United States of

America has first been obtained, the Russian Federation
shall not transfer title to, or possession of, any material,
training or services provided pursuant to this Agreement

to any entity, other than an officer, employee or agent of
a Party to this Agreement and shall not permit the use of

53. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning the Provision
of Material, Services, and Training Relating to the Construction of a Safe, Secure, and
Ecologically Sound Storage Facility for Fissile Material Derived from the Destruction of
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 32, arts. IV, VI.
54. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the Provision of Material, Services,
and Related Training to Ukraine in Connection with the Elimination of Strategic Nuclear
Arms, Dec. 5, 1993, annexes A, B, C, D, Hein's No. KAV 3760, Temp. State Dep't No. 9441.
55. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Committee for Defense Industry of the Russian Federation Concerning
Cooperation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms, supra note 25, arts. III, IV.
56. Defense articles and related services provided to foreign governments are subject to
significant retransfer restrictions under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 505(a), 22
U.S.C. § 2314(a) (1988).
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such material, training or services for purposes other than
those for which it has been furnished.57
Recognizing the long-term importance and political sensitivity of

the possible diversion of some types of equipment to unauthorized
or inappropriate uses, each of the four CTR umbrella agreements

contains unique provisions that make the most sensitive and longterm obligations, such as those restricting the retransfer of U.S.-

provided equipment, continue even after the agreement expires.
The U.S.-Russia CITR Umbrella Agreement provides, for example,

that unless the parties agree in writing, such rights "shall continue
to apply without respect to time."58
Finally, all CTR assistance is subject to broad audit and examination provisions, authorizing the Department of Defense to examine
the use of all assistance provided to recipient governments and to

audit all related records, information and documentation. For
example, the U.S.-Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement provides:

Upon written request provided thirty days in advance,
representatives of the Government of the United States
of America shall have the right, during the period of this

Agreement and for three years thereafter, to examine the
use of any material, knowledge obtained as a result of
training, or services provided in accordance with this

Agreement at sites of their location or use, and shall have
the right to inspect and audit any and all records or documentation related to the use of material, knowledge
obtained as a result of training, or services provided in
accordance with this Agreement. 9
57. U.S.-Russia CIR Umbrella Agreement. supra note 20, art. VI; see also U.S.Kazakhstan Cl7R Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VI, para. I (similar provision);
the U.S.-Ukraine CTR Umbrella Agreement. supra note 20. art. V, para. 2 (same): U.S.Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VI (same). A recipient government
must also "take all reasonable measures within its power to ensure the security of material,
training or services provided pursuant to this Agreement and shall protect them against
seizure or conversion." U.S.-Russia CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20. art. XII;
see also U.S.-Kazakhstan CrR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VI, para. 2
(similar provision); U.S.-Belarus CrR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XII

(same).
58. U.S.-Russia CR Umbrella Agreement. supra note 20, art. XIV; see also U.S.Kazakhstan CIR Umbrella Agreement supra note 20, art. XIV (similar provision); U.S.Ukraine CrR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XIII (same); U.S.-Belarus CTR
Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. II (same).
59. U.S.-Belarus CrR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XIII; see also U.S.Kazakhstan CrR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. X (similar provision); U.S.Ukraine CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. X (same). With respect to the
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The Department of Defense is now implementing broad audit

and examination rights provided for in CTR agreements, and the
General Accounting Office has noted that in addition to confirming recipient countries are indeed using that assistance for its
intended purposes, "[the r]esults of these audits and examinations
can provide important input to planning efforts. '60
C. Status of Personnel/ActivitiesProvisions
In order to implement the CTR assistance program effectively

and protect important U.S. interests in recipient countries, the
Department of Defense has sought to ensure that its military and
civilian personnel and contractors can perform their duties free

from inappropriate interference by the host/recipient governments;
that the materials imported to support CTR programs are free

from customs duties, taxes, charges or other restrictions that these
governments could impose; and that various U.S. government func-

tions such as contracting and military airlift activities are free from
Russian Federation, the U.S.-Russia CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. XIII, provides
similar audit and examination rights for the United States but requires that they "be
carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon by the Parties." Thus, each
CTR Implementing Agreement under the U.S.-Russia CTR Umbrella Agreement
provides additional procedures applicable to the conduct of audits and examinations under
that implementing agreement. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Department of Defense
of the United States of America and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic
Energy Concerning the Provision of Material, Services, and Training Relating to the
Construction of a Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Storage Facility for Fissile Material
Derived from the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 53, art. VIII (providing
that:
Upon 30 days advance notice and no more than three times in each calendar
year, representatives of the DoD shall have the right to inspect the use of any
material, training, or other services provided pursuant to this Agreement at sites
where located or used, and shall have the right to inspect and audit all related
records or documentation for materials, training and services provided, both
during the period of this Agreement and for three years thereafter.)
60. United States General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing
the Threat from the Former Soviet Union 7 (Oct. 1994). A June 1995 GAO report notes
that "DoD has recently made some initial progress in conducting audits and examinations
of CTR aid to ensure that aid is being used for the purposes intended." United States
General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the
Former Soviet Union: An Update 11 (June 1995). In spite of this GAO report, Congress
remains concerned over the slow pace of these audits. The Committee on National
Security of the House of Representatives has emphasized the importance it places on such
audit and examination provisions by recently expressing "its alarm over the fact that the
Department of Defense has conducted only three audit and examination visits to verify the
whereabouts and condition of U.S. assistance delivered to the states of the former Soviet
Union since the program's inception over four years ago." H.R. Rep. No. 131, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 256 (1995).
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inappropriate restrictions. Each of the four CTR umbrella agreements therefore contains a number of provisions establishing legal
obligations for the host/recipient governments with respect to these
status issues. In many respects, these status provisions resemble
certain provisions in "status of forces agreements" (SOFAs), governing the status of U.S. military forces stationed overseas.61 These
SOFAs define the relationship between the shared sovereign prerogatives of the sending and receiving states and establish various
rights, immunities and responsibilities for the force. As the United
States has a fundamental interest in ensuring that receiving states
use its assistance properly and effectively and because the funds at
issue are subject to so many unique statutory restrictions and fiscal
controls, the "status" provisions of the CTR umbrella agreements
are in many respects even more favorable to the United States than
those generally applicable to U.S. forces stationed overseas.62
To prevent potentially disruptive interference in their implementation of CTR assistance activities, all U.S. government personnel
on the territory of the states receiving CTR assistance enjoy immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction for all activities related to
CTR agreements. The agreements express this immunity in terms
according CTR personnel a status equivalent to "administrative
and technical" (A&T) personnel under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations 63 through provisions such as the following:
Military and civilian employees of the Government of the
United States of America and their families present in the
territory of the Republic of Belarus for activities related
to this Agreement shall be accorded privileges and immunities equivalent to that accorded administrative and tech-

61. See Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
62. See, e.g., id. at art. VII(1)(b) (authorizing the "receiving State" to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over members of the force or the civilian component of the sending State in a
variety of circumstances). U.S.-Belarus Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. IX
(providing complete immunity from criminal jurisdiction to military and civilian employees
and their families present in the Republic of Belarus for activities related to the
agreement).

63. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, para. 2, 23
U.S.T. 3227,500 U.N.T.S. 95. Such A&T status also provides immunity to CTR personnel
from civil and administrative jurisdiction for acts performed within the course of their
duties.
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nical staff personnel in accordance with the Vienna

Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961. 64
In addition to providing legal status for U.S. personnel, CTR

agreements also provide immunities for U.S. government functions
or activities. To ensure that CTR funds are not diverted from

Nunn-Lugar statutory objectives to pay taxes or other charges on
assistance activities to recipient governments, each CTR umbrella
agreement provides the U.S. government, its personnel, contractors and activities with broad immunities from such taxation. The
agreements set forth these broad immunities in provisions such as

the following: "The United States of America, its personnel, contractors, and contractors' personnel shall be exempt from liability,

in connection with activities under this Agreement, for payment of
any tax or similar charges assessed on the territory of Ukraine.

'6

To avoid any confusion about the duty-free or tax-free status of
materials the United States imports into these countries to implement CTR agreements, separate provisions explicitly provide that

the import of materials "shall not be subject to any license, other
restrictions, tariffs, customs charges, duties,'66taxes or other charges
imposed by national and local authorities.
Although each government receiving CTR assistance is obliged

to "facilitate the entry and exit of employees of the Government of
the United States of America and [its] contractor personnel" for
the purpose of carrying out CTR assistance activities, 67 circumstances may require special protections for the entry and exit of
64. U.S.-Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. IX, para. 1; see also
U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VIII, para. 1 (similar
provision); U.S.- Ukraine CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para.1
(same); U.S.-Russia CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. IX (same).
65. U.S.-Ukraine CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VIII, para. 1; see also
U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. IX, para. 1 (similar
provision); U.S.-Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. X, para. 1 (same);
U.S.-Russia CIR Agreement, supra note 20, art. X, para. 1 (same).
66. U.S.-Kazakhstan CfR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. IX, para. 2; see also
U.S.-Ukraine CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. VIII, para. 1 (similar provision); U.S.Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. X, para. 1 (same); U.S.-Russia CTR
Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. X, para. 1 (same). CTR umbrella agreements
also contain provisions exempting CTR assistance from customs inspections or establishing
expedited customs procedures. See, e.g., U.S.-Ukraine CTR Agreement, supra note 20,
art. VIII, para. 2 (providing that "[a]ll such imported and exported material ... at entry
shall be free of customs inspections").
67. U.S.-Russia CrR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. V, para. 1; see also U.S.Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. V, para. 1 (similar provision);
U.S.-Ukraine CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. IV, para. 1. (same); U.S.-Belarus CTR
Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. V, para. 1 (same).
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U.S. government and military aircraft in connection with CTR
activities. Accordingly, the CTR umbrella agreements have provi-

sions expressly making such aircraft: "free of customs charges....
airport charges, and any other charges assessed on the territory of
the Republic of Belarus. Aircraft owned or operated by the

United States Department of Defense shall be free of customs
inspections. "68

As contractors provide a significant amount of CTR assistance,
one of the most important provisions in each CTR umbrella agreement ensures that U.S. law will govern the award of contracts

related to the implementation of CIR activities, thus avoiding a
variety of problems, including prolonged disputes over any "prefer-

ences" the recipient state might request for local companies and
recipient government-affiliated institutions in the contract award
process. 69 The following provision provides an example of how the
agreements explicitly guarantee an award process governed by
68. U.S.-Belarus CrR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. V, para. 2; see also U.S.Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. V. para. 2 (similar provision);
U.S.-Ukraine CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. IV, para. 2 (same); U.S.-Russia CTR
Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. X, para. 1 (same). Recipient governments must
also provide certain services for such aircraft. See, e.g.. U.S.-Belarus CTR Umbrella
Agreement, supra note 20, art. V, para. 3 (providing that "[t]he Republic of Belarus shall
provide, at no expense to the United States, parking, security protection, and servicing for
aircraft of the United States of America").
69. The original 1991 Nunn-Lugar legislation provided that the CTR program -should.
to the extent feasible, draw upon United States technology and United States technicians."
The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 § 212(b). 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note.
Congress reinforced this "buy-American" preference in the Former Soviet Union
Demilitarization Act of 1992, by adding the following provision to § 1412(c): -The
programs described in this section should, to the extent feasible, draw upon United States
technology and expertise, especially from the United States private sector." The Former
Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 § 1412(c), 22 U.S.C. § 5902(c). These statutory
"buy-American" preferences make the application of U.S. contracting procedures even
more important in the contract award process, notwithstanding a recent "sense of
Congress" that restated this preference and added that "the United States should work
with local contractors in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine when doing so would
expedite more effective use of those funds." The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995, § 1209(b)(3). Consistent with the many statements of the program's
congressional supporters that it was not to be a "foreign aid program," it is clear that much
of the support for the original Nunn-Lugar legislation was founded on the concept that
Nunn-Lugar funds were to be directed primarily to U.S. personnel and U.S. companies, not
to entities of the former Soviet Union. As one proponent argued during the debate over
the use of these funds, "Let me emphasize that this money is not going to the Soviet
Union, this money is going to United States personnel to help dismantle weapons that
threaten the United States." 137 Cong. Rec. H11,472 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement
of Rep. Murtha). Another Congressman stated: "I want to assure my friend that there is
no pass-through of money to the Soviet Union in any foreign aid form." 137 Cong. Rec.
H11,471 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. McDade).
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U.S. law, facilitating expeditious and effective implementation of
CTR-related contracts: "In the event that the United States of
America awards contracts for the acquisition of material and services, including those related to construction, to implement this
Agreement, such contracts shall be awarded in accordance with the
laws and regulations of the United States of America. ' 70 The CTR
agreements also explicitly exempt the contract-related acquisition
of materials and services within the recipient country from the payment of any "fees, duties, additional taxes, or similar charges
' 71
imposed by national or local authorities."
Although foreign governments do not always initially welcome
"status" provisions such as those found in CTR agreements, a comprehensive legal framework for long-term and diverse international
cooperative activities would be inadequate without them, particularly given the United States' desire to protect assistance programs
from unnecessary interference and to better ensure that recipient
governments apply assistance to agreed objectives.
D. Liability Provisions
In light of the obvious potential hazards, risks and liabilities
related to any activity involving weapons and weapons materials,
particularly nuclear weapons, the Department of Defense has
focused considerable attention on liability provisions in the CTR
program. As the Defense Department has limited legal authority
to assume liabilities for the CTR program overseas (even if having
such authority were deemed to be desirable) and because many
aspects of CTR assistance implementation activities are beyond the
U.S. government's direct control, the Department of Defense
sought and ultimately received broad and comprehensive waivers
of liability for CTR-related activities from recipient governments.
These waivers and related liability restrictions comprise a four-part
legal regime set forth in applicable provisions of both CTR
umbrella and implementing agreements.
70. U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XII, para. 1; see
also U.S.-Ukraine CGR Agreement, supra note 20, art. IX (similar provision); U.S.-Belarus
CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XI (same); the U.S.-Russia CTR Umbrella
Agreement, supra note 20, art. XI (same).
71. U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XII, para. 1; see
also U.S.-Ukraine CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. IX (similar provision); U.S.-Belarus
CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XI, para. 1 (same); U.S.-Russia CTR
Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. XI, para. 1 (same).
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First, each CTR umbrella agreement contains a provision, such
as the following, in which the recipient government waives all
claims against the United States and U.S. contractors:
The Republic of Belarus shall hold harmless and bring no
legal proceedings against the United States of America,
its personnel, contractors, and contractors' personnel of
the United States of America, for damage to or loss of
property owned by the Republic of Belarus, or death or
injury to any personnel of the Republic of Belarus, arising
out of activities related to this Agreement. 72
Although recipient governments initially argued that their liability waivers should include exceptions for U.S. conduct that was
"reckless," "grossly negligent" or "intentional," the United States
refused, due to the difficulty in applying these subjective terms to
some of the inherently dangerous activities contemplated, the limited U.S. authority for assuming potentially enormous liabilities,
the unilateral nature of the funding for these assistance activities
and the lack of direct U.S. control over many of the activities envisioned. In some cases, however, the parties included non-binding
provisions stating that the United States "plans, to the maximum
extent feasible, to avoid activities.., which might give rise to damage to or loss of property, or death or injury to personnel." 73 The
parties also included terms which gave the United States discretion
in providing compensation for CTR-related accidents. These terms
provided that waivers by the recipient governments "shall not prevent the Parties from providing compensation in accordance with
their national laws." 74
A second element of the liability regime for CTR assistance
activities consists of an obligation undertaken by recipient govern72. U.S.-Belarus CR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. 1: see also
U.S.-Kazakhstan CIR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. I (similar
provision); U.S.-Ukraine CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. VI, para. I (same); U.S.Russia CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. 1 (same).
73. U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. 1; see
also U.S.-Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. I (similar
provision).
74. U.S.-Russia CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. 3; see also

U.S.-Kazakhstan CrR Umbrella Agreement supra note 20, art. VII, para. 3 (similar
provision); U.S.-Ukraine CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. VI, para. 3 (same). Along

similar discretionary lines, the United States also agreed in one other C!R agreement to
"give sympathetic consideration to requests by the Republic of Belarus for compensation
for claims arising out of activities under this Agreement." U.S.-Belarus CTR Umbrella
Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. 3.
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ments to assume responsibility for potential third-party claims
related to the implementation of CTR agreements. The agreements express this obligation in terms such as the following:

"Claims by third parties, arising out of the acts or omissions of any
employees of the United States of America or contractors or con-

tractors' personnel of the United States of America done in performance of official duty, shall be the responsibility of the Russian
Federation." 75

A third component of the liability regime for CTR assistance
activities is a provision in each CTR implementing agreement
expressing the limited nature of any warranties or guarantees associated with the performance of U.S.-provided assistance. For
example, an implementing agreement addressing assistance for

nuclear material control and accounting provides that the Department of Defense "shall not be responsible either for ensuring the
proper use of any assistance provided pursuant to this Agreement
or for any case where such assistance fails to provide intended
levels of performance. '76 Depending on the type of assistance pro-

vided, other CTR implementing agreements specify that the
Department of Defense is not responsible "in any case where
material, training or services fail to provide intended levels of protection, '77 "for any failure of equipment, property, supplies,
train79

ing, or services

78

or "for not achieving planned results.

75. U.S.-Russia CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. 2; see also
U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. 2 (similar
provision); U.S.-Ukraine CTR Agreement, supra note 20, art. VI, para. 2 (same); U.S.Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, para. 2 (same).
76. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Control,
Accounting, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to Promote the Prevention of
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, Dec. 13, 1993, art. I, para. 4, Hein's No. KAV 3753, Temp.
State Dep't No. 94-34.
77. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning Technical
Assistance For Design of a Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Storage Facility for Fissile
Material Derived from the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, Oct. 5, 1992, art. I, para. 3 (on
file with the Virginia Journalof InternationalLaw).
78. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of American
and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning Control,
Accounting, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Sept. 2, 1993, art. I, para. 4,
Hein's No. KAV 3668, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-179.
79. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the Provision to Ukraine of Material
and Services for the Establishment of a Government-to-Government Communications
Link, Dec. 18, 1993, art. I, para. 3, Hein's No. KAV 3745, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-27.
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Finally, CTR implementing agreements attempt to limit potential liabilities, failures and accidents by providing only equipment

that is appropriate for achieving agreed technical objectives,80 that
is inspected at the time of delivery to ensure conformance with

established specifications81 and that is closely linked to any necessary training8 In view of the variety of CTR projects, no simple

standard provision addresses all these concerns, but each agreement attempts to establish a firm technical foundation for the par-

ticular type of assistance to be provided. For some projects, as in
the case of specialized armored blankets provided to the Russian
Federation to facilitate the safe and secure transportation of

nuclear weapons in connection with their elimination and in the
80. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing the extensive annexes
found in many CTR implementing agreements setting forth the specific equipment,
material, training or services required for achieving agreed demilitarization objectives).
81. A typical provision in a CR implementing agreement requires the following:
The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall examine all
material received pursuant to this Agreement and provide confirmation to the
Department of Defense of the United States of America within thirty days of
receipt that it conforms with the specifications established by the Department of
Defense of the United States of America and made available in advance to the
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Any material failing to
conform with these specifications shall be returned to the United States of
America through the Embassy of the United States of America at Almaty within
forty days of receipt for replacement.
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision to the
Republic of Kazakhstan of Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training in Connection with the Removal of Nuclear Warheads from the Republic of Kazakhstan for
Destruction and the Removal of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and the Destruction of
Their Silo Launchers, Dec. 13, 1993, art. IV, Hein's No. KAV 3749, Temp. State Dep't No.
94-30.
82. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the
Safe and Secure Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Through the Provision of
Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training, June 17, 1992, art. VI, para. 1,
Temp. State Dep't No. 92-171, (providing that "[t]he delivery of ... training shall be
integrated, to the maximum extent feasible, with the delivery of the equipment such that
the equipment may be operated safely as soon as practical after it is delivered"). At the
Defense Department's discretion, such training may be provided in a maximum of five
phases, including a training program review phase, initial operator training, periodic review
training, update training and a maintenance and calibration training phase. Id. at art. VI,
para.2. Annex A to this agreement sets forth a list and description of required emergency
response equipment. Id. at annex A.
83. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and
Secure Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Through the Provision of
Armored Blankets, June 17, 1992, Hein's No. KAV 3349, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-171.
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case of specialized containers s4 and specialized railcars8 5 provided

to the Russian Federation to facilitate the safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials, this

means lengthy and extensive joint development, testing and
evaluation.
It is important to note that although recipient governments

receive the explicit right to make recommendations on the specifications for necessary equipment, the Department of Defense does
have discretionary powers in this area and retains the sole right to
establish the ultimate technical specifications, including any applicable safety standards.8 6 Finally, if circumstances require addi-

tional technical arrangements, procedures or clarifications, each
CTR implementing agreement contains a provision authorizing the

parties' representatives to enter "additional arrangements" to carry
out the provisions of the agreement. s7 These "additional arrange-

ments" allow technical representatives to address and resolve outstanding implementation issues without engaging the formal
amendment process. Governing provisions in each CTR implementing agreement explicitly provide that "[i]n case of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any provisions of such

arrangements, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail."'8

84. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and
Secure Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Material Through the Provision of
Fissile Material Containers, June 17, 1992 (on file with the Virginia Journalof International
Law).
85. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning the Safe and
Secure Transportation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Material Through the
Provision of Cargo and Guard Railcar Conversion Kits, Aug. 28, 1992 (on file with the
Virginia Journal of InternationalLaw).
86. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the
Safe and Secure Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Material Through the
Provision of Fissile Material Containers, supra note 84, art. I, para. 1 (requiring that the
U.S. Department of Defense provide containers "conforming with technical specifications
established by the DoD. In establishing these technical specifications, the DoD shall take
into account the recommendations of the MINATOM and the results of technical
discussions between the Parties.").
87. See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the Provision of Material,
Services, and Related Training to Ukraine in Connection with the Elimination of Strategic
Nuclear Arms, supra note 54, art. VII.
88. Id.; see also Implementing Arrangement Between the Department of Defense of the
United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on Facilitating
Cooperation Under the Agreement of December 5, 1993 Concerning the Elimination of
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CONCLUSION

The unique bilateral legal regime established to implement the
Nunn-Lugar demilitarization program continues to grow and
develop as existing CTR agreements are extended or enlarged, as
the parties identify and plan new areas of cooperation and as Congress continues to provide additional appropriations for the program-albeit with additional restrictions and new conditions. In a
period of increasing anxiety in the U.S. Congress over the efficacy
of U.S. funding of overseas activities and a growing aversion to
foreign aid programs generally, this innovative legal regime serves
as a potential model for the delivery, use and accounting of bilateral, performance-oriented international assistance activities
designed to achieve specific objectives, especially when those activities are subject to significant monitoring requirements and fiscal
and legal restrictions.89
Recently expressed "findings" and a "sense of Congress" on the
future of the Nunn-Lugar Program reaffirmed, inter alia, that:
[i]t is a pressing national security challenge for the United
States to expedite the safe and secure dismantlement of
the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union.... Leakage of nuclear materials and technology, and the continuing threat of emigration of scientists and technicians from
the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex, pose a grave
Strategic Nuclear Arms in Ukraine, June 27, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journal of
InternationalLaw) (similar provision).
89. A framework which is substantively identical to the umbrella agreement/
Department of Defense implementing agreement model discussed in this paper has
already been used for at least one U.S. assistance project not involving Nunn-Lugar funds.
See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Repblic of Latvia Concerning Technical Assistance Related to the
Elimination of Conventional Weapons Systems and Facilities Formerly Controlled by the
Russian Federation Armed Forces Stationed in the Territory of the Republic of Latvia.
U.S.-Latvia, Aug. 12, 1994, Hein's No. KAV 4007, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-214;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development of the Republic of
Latvia Concerning the Provision of Assistance Related to the Dismantlement of the
Unfinished Skrunda LPAR Facility Formerly Controlled by the Russian Federation Armed
Forces, Aug. 12, 1994, Hein's No. KAV 4008, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-215.
Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreements and the international legal framework that they
provide have also been incorporated by reference in other assistance agreements which do
not involve Nunn-Lugar funds but share similar demilitarization goals or objectives. See
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus Concerning the Disposal of the Remnants
of Dismantled Conventional Military Equipment, Aug. 12, 1994, Hein's No. KAV 4009,
Temp. State Dep't No. 94-216.
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threat to United States national security and international
stability. . . . [T]he United States should expedite the
availability and effective application of so-called "NunnLugar" funds.90
The bilateral legal regime now in place between the Department of
Defense and government agencies of the states of the former
Soviet Union provides an opportunity and a framework to achieve
this congressional goal of expeditious and effective application of
Nunn-Lugar funds in order to achieve specific U.S. national security objectives.

90. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, §§ 1209(a)(1), (a)(3),
(b)(2).
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APPENDIX

LIST OF "NuNN-LUGAR" AGREEMENTS

Republic of Belarus
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Belarus Concerning Emergency Response and the Prevention
of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Oct. 22, 1992,
U.S.-Belarus, Hein's No. KAV 3416, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-252
[the US-Belarus CTR Umbrella Agreement];
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Belarus Concerning the Provision of Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training in Connection with the Removal of
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems from
the Republic of Belarus for Destruction, Oct. 22, 1992, Hein's No.
KAV 3416, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-252; Amendment thereto of
July 22, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3638, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-153;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus Concerning the Provision of Assistance Related to the Establishment
of Export Control Systems to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction from the Republic of Belarus, Oct. 22, 1992
(on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law); Amendment thereto of Apr. 29, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3551, Temp. State
Dep't No. 93-104; Amendment thereto of July 22, 1993 (on file
with the Virginia Journalof InternationalLaw);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Belarus Concerning the Provision of Material and Services for the
Establishment of a Continuous Communications Link, Jan. 15,
1993, Hein's No. KAV 3481, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-37; Extension thereto of October 20, 1994 (on file with the Virginia Journal
of InternationalLaw);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Belarus Concerning the Conversion of Military Technologies and
Capabilities into Civilian Activities, July 22, 1993, Hein's No. KAV
3637, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-152;
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Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Belarus Concerning the Environmental Restoration of Former
Strategic Rocket Forces Facilities and Sites to Promote the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 22,
1993, Hein's No. KAV 3636, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-151;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Belarus Concerning the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms,
June 23, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journal of International
Law);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Belarus Concerning Control, Accounting, and Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material to Promote the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, June 23, 1995 (on file with the VirginiaJournalof
InternationalLaw).
Republic of Kazakhstan
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Destruction of Silo Launchers of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency Response, and the
Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Dec. 13, 1993,
U.S.-Kazakhstan, Hein's No. KAV 3751, Temp. State Dep't No. 9432 [the U.S.-Kazakhstan CTR Umbrella Agreement];
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision to the Republic of Kazakhstan of Material and Services for the Establishment of a Government-to-Government Communications Link, Dec. 13, 1993 (on file
with the Virginia Journal of International Law); Amendment
thereto of June 30, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journalof International Law);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision of Assistance to the Republic of Kazakhstan Related to the Establishment of Export Control
Systems to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 13, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3752, Temp. State Dep't No.
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94-33; Amendment thereto of June 30, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journal of InternationalLaw);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision of Material, Services, and
Related Training to the Republic of Kazakhstan in Connection
with the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles and Associated Equipment and Components, Dec. 13,
1993, Hein's No. KAV 3750, State Dep't No. 94-31; Amendment
thereto of July 1, 1995 (on file with the VirginiaJournalof International Law);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Kazakhstan Concerning Control, Accounting, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to Promote the Prevention of Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation, Dec. 13,1993, Hein's No. KAV 3753, Temp.
State Dep't No. 94-34; Amendment thereto of June 30, 1995 (on
file with the Virginia Journal of InternationalLaw);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision to the Republic of Kazakhstan of Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training in
Connection with the Removal of Nuclear Warheads from the
Republic of Kazakhstan for Destruction and the Removal of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and the Destruction of Their Silo
Launchers, Dec. 13,1993, Hein's No. KAV 3749, Temp. State Dep't
No. 94-30;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Kazakhstan Concerning the Conversion of Military Technologies
and Capabilities into Civilian Activities, Mar. 19, 1994, Hein's No.
KAV 3823, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-109;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Science and New Technologies of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure, Oct. 3, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journalof InternationalLaw).
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Russian Federation
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons
Proliferation, June 17, 1992, U.S.-Russia, Hein's No. KAV 3349,
Temp. State Dep't No. 92-171 [the US-Russia CTR Umbrella
Agreement];
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation
and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Through the Provision of
Armored Blankets, June 17, 1992, Hein's No. KAV 3349, Temp.
State Dep't No. 92-171;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation
and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Material Through the Provision
of Fissile Material Containers, June 17, 1992 (on file with the Virginia Journal of InternationalLaw);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation
and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Through the Provision of Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training, June 17, 1992,
Temp. State Dep't No. 92-171; Protocol thereto of March 26, 1993,
Hein's KAV No. 3536, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-88;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the President's Committee on Conventional
Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons of the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe, Secure and Ecologically Sound
Destruction of Chemical Weapons, July 20, 1992 (on file with the
Virginia Journal of International Law); Amendment thereto of
March 18, 1994, Hein's No. KAV 3821, Temp. State Dep't No. 94107;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for
Atomic Energy Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation of
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Material Through the Pro-
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vision of Cargo and Guard Railcar Conversion Kits, Aug. 28, 1992
(on file with the Virginia Journal of InternationalLaw); Amendment thereto of March 23, 1994 (on file with the VirginiaJournalof
InternationalLaw);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for
Atomic Energy Concerning Technical Assistance For Design of a
Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Storage Facility for Fissile
Material Derived from the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, Oct.
5, 1992 (on file with the Virginia Journalof InternationalLaw);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Committee for Defense Industry of the
Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Elimination of
Strategic Offensive Arms, Aug. 26, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3663,
Temp. State Dep't No. 93-173; Amendment thereto of April 3,
1995, Temp. State Dep't No. 95-101; Amendment thereto of June
20, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journalof InternationalLaw);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for
Atomic Energy Concerning the Provision of Material, Services,
and Training Relating to the Construction of a Safe, Secure, and
Ecologically Sound Storage Facility for Fissile Material Derived
from the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, Sept. 2, 1993, Hein's
No. 3667, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-178; Amendment thereto of
June 20, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journal of International
Law);
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for
Atomic Energy Concerning Control, Accounting, and Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, Sept. 2, 1993, Hein's No. KAV
3668, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-179; Amendment thereto of January 20, 1995, Temp. State Dep't No. 95-48;
Protocol Between the Department of Defense of the United States
of America and the Ministries of Defense and Economics of the
Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Implementation of Certain Defense Conversion Projects, Dec. 16, 1993, Hein's No. KAV
3742, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-25; Amendment thereto of March
18, 1994, Hein's No. KAV 3822, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-108;
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Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in Nuclear Weapons Storage
Security Through Provision of Material, Services, and Related
Training, Apr. 3, 1995, Temp. State Dep't No. 95-100; Amendment
thereto of June 21, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law);

Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Through Provision of Material, Services, and Related
Training, Apr. 3, 1995, Temp. State Dep't No. 95-102; Amendment
thereto of June 21, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journalof International Law).
Ukraine

Agreement Between Ukraine and the United States of America
Concerning Assistance to Ukraine in the Elimination of Strategic
Nuclear Arms, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Oct. 25, 1993, U.S.-Ukraine, Hein's No. KAV
3765, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-46 (entered into force Dec. 31,
1993) [the U.S.-Ukraine CTR Umbrella Agreement];
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Expert and Technical Committee of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Concerning the Provision of
Assistance to Ukraine Related to the Establishment of an Export
Control System to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction from Ukraine, Dec. 5, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3758,
Temp. State Dep't No. 94-39; Amendment thereto of March 21,
1994, Hein's No. KAV 3831, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-117;
Amendment thereto of June 27, 1995 (on file with the Virginia
Journal of InternationalLaw);

Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the Provision of Material, Services, and Related to Training
to Ukraine in Connection with the Elimination of Strategic
Nuclear Arms, & annexes A, B, C, D thereto, Dec. 5, 1993, Hein's
No. KAV 3760, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-41; Amendment 1 to
Annex C of December 18, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3761, Temp. State
Dep't No. 94-42; Amendment 2 to Annex C of December 18, 1993,
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Hein's No. KAV 3762, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-43; Amendment
of March 21, 1994, Hein's No. KAV 3830, Temp. State Dep't No.
94-116; Amendment thereto of June 27, 1995 (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law); Implementing Arrangement
of June 27, 1995 (on file with the VirginiaJournal of International
Law);

Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the Provision to Ukraine of Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training in Connection with the Removal of
Nuclear Warheads from Ukraine for Destruction in the Course of
Elimination of Strategic Nuclear Arms, Dec. 18, 1993, Hein's No.
KAV 3759, Temp. State Dep't No. 94-40;
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear
and Radiation Safety Concerning Development of State Systems of
Control, Accounting, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
to Promote the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation from
Ukraine, Dec. 18, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3763, Temp. State Dep't
No. 94-44; Amendment thereto of March 21, 1994, Hein's No.
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